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BOOKS REVIEWED
The Silent Partners: Institutional Investors and Corporate Control.
By Daniel Jay Baum and Ned B. Stiles. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1965.
Pp. xiv, 176. $5.95.
Perhaps an initial help, in a nontechnical approach to The Silent Partners, would
be a translation or paraphrase of the book's title, various chapter headings and some
of its terminology. The reader might thus discern more exactly the directions and
scope of the book.
More correctly explicative of the book's content would have been the title: The
Growth and Internal Regulation of Institutional Investors, with the subtitle: With
Occasional Reflections on Their Influence on Portfolio Corporations.
To the contrary, the title as used, and especially the subtitle, could lead to the im-
pression that the institutional investors-pension funds, insurance companies, trust
departments, mutual funds and foundations-were in fact in a position of corporate
control over their portfolio companies and that the book would propose a philosophy
of law for these massive, silent, behind-the-scenes contr~leurs.
A second pitfall arises from the chapter headings and terminology, particularly the
repeated reference to institutional "power." In fact, the word "power" is in a sense
the focal point of the book. Understandably, "power" could be thought to be synony-
mous with the "corporate control" of the subtitle. The reader might think that it was
this power that constituted the institutional investor as the contrbleur of its portfolio
companies. The word, however, is actually used in three different senses.
The "power" referred to throughout the heart of the book, chapters five and six,
designates powerful attributes of the institutional investor. But these attributes are
almost entirely unrelated to the portfolio companies. The "power" here, and the power
principally discussed throughout, concerns the institution itself and not its corporate
holdings. It is the "power," for example, to control rates within the banking industry,
or to eliminate competition among insurance companies, or to affect the economy, or
to influence governmental action, to badger suppliers, to coerce labor, or even to
cheat the minority shareholders. But in every case, the rates, the competition, the
suppliers, the labor and the minority shareholders belong to the institution itself
and operate within the industry of the institutional investor, and are irrelevant, except
remotely, to the portfolio companies. The "internal regulation" of this "power" is
the major concern of the book-hence the hypothetical title.
In the brief chapter four, "Some Uses of Institutional Power," the word "power"
assumes its second meaning, and, for the first time, it does refer to the portfolio
companies. But, it is not yet the "corporate control" of the subtitle. The distinction
between these types of power is, in reality, the distinction between "influence"
exerted upon the portfolio companies and actual "custody" of them:
Conceivably only a difference of degree exists between influence and custody, al-
though in their purest forms they are antipodal extremes. General Motors as a
sole consumer undoubtedly will exercise more or less hidden pressures on a parts
supplier. These pressures, although highly influential cumulatively, do not constitute
custody.
As these pressures, however, approach and pass a certain point, mere influence
ceases and custody begins. Differences in degree become a change in kind. General
Motors moves from minor suggestions to isolated policy dictation to the final assump-
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tion of complete custody-through a voluntary or possibly forced appropriation-
expressed in the nomination and dictation of the board of directors.1
"Influence"--the second usage of the word "power"--is truly "antipodal" to the total
custody of "corporate control."
Only when the book reaches the last chapter, "Power and Responsibility," does it
take up the question of corporate control over the portfolio corporations. Here the
word "power" takes on its third meaning. The analysis in these pages leaves no doubt
that the "corporate control" of the title, and the "power" of the last chapter, have
been used in the modern, technical sense as "the ultimate power in the policy-making
hierarchy." 2
Armed with these terminological distinctions, the reader can approach the book for
what it is really worth: (1) a factual summary of the recent growth-rate of the in-
stitutional investor, and (2) the internal regulation of its various powerful attributes.
The chief contribution of the book relative to corporate control itself is this factual
background, which is indispensable to the work of the corporate philosophers.
I. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS
A. The Distant Background
To set the scene for the recent emergence of the institutional investor, the first
chapter traces the gradual evolution of the modem corporate society from individual
entrepreneur and small partnership to the present-day separation of ownership from
control and the diffusion of that corporate ownership into the hands of twenty million
shareholders. In a familiar story, the authors detail the concentration of the country's
assets in a relatively few corporate giants and describe the mechanics of mere-in-
cumbency control effected by the wide diffusion of shares and the dominance of the
proxy system.
Chapter one, correctly titled "The Evolution of a Proletarian Capitalism," next
comments on three "existing restraints on the corporate power elite": 3 (1) the Gilbert-
Soss liaison; (2) the threat of a proxy fight (the tender-offer had not yet gained
popularity at the time of writing) ;4 (3) the derivative suit.
Into this wide share-diffusion has come a new force-and a source of further
diffusion-the institutional investor. "Institutional holdings of common stocks listed
on the New York Stock Exchange have risen from approximately 12 per cent of all
1. Bayne, The Definition of Corporate Control, 9 St. Louis U.L.J. 445, 450 (1965).
2. Bayne, Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee, 53 Geo. L.J. 543, 561 (1965). To be metic-
ulously correct: "The corporate control is a relation of total custody, subsisting between the
office of the contr6leur and the corporation, giving rise to a complexus of duties and a corre-
sponding complexus of rights." Bayne, The Definition of Corporate Control, 9 St. Louis U.L.J.
445, 446 (1965).
3. The word "power" as used in the term "power elite" is most generic, without any spe-
cific reference either to corporate control or even necessarily to any influence over a portfolio
company.
4. "To illustrate the increased use of the device, during the last year there have been
twenty-nine cash takeover bids involving companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange
and fifteen involving companies listed on the American Stock Exchange. This compares with
only eight cash takeover bids in 1960 involving stocks listed on both exchanges." Address by
Manuel F. Cohen to the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc., June 28, 1966
(unpublished).
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stocks listed on the Exchange in 1949 to over 20 per cent at the end of 1963, and the
Exchange has estimated that this figure will reach 30 per cent by 1970."5 This estimate
may be conservative. Thus, a 1966 Fortune survey indicates that at least the pension
funds "are unswervingly bullish about the long-term case for equities, and plan to
hold higher and higher proportions of stock in bigger and bigger portfolios." Fortune
did not discuss corporate control, but did remark, at least regarding pension funds, that
"there is every reason to believe that their influence will keep right on rising."i
This interposition of the institutional investor between the owned-asset in the
portfolio company and the owner-shareholder of the institutional investor succeeds
in separating ownership from control by one more manager. The authors' alarmed view
of institutional-investor influence on portfolio companies is appreciably mitigated when
they "recall that majority ownership of the large publicly held corporations is a near
impossibility. As a rule, no individual shareholder holds more than 1 per cent of the
outstanding stock. And even institutional holdings generally do not exceed 5 per cent."8
These institutional holdings, of course, represent "the aggregate amount of such issues
held by eighteen hundred institutions . .. .,9
Although the author is fully cognizant of "the improved climate of corporate
morality," 10 attributable generally to the SEC, the New York Stock Exchange and the
corporate Bar, nonetheless the first chapter correctly closes with a plea for heightened
standards for the corporate contr61eurs, especially the institutional ones. Finally, the
chapter poses the question for the future: what will come of the "opportunities
springing from the fact that the institutions are rapidly acquiring, and indeed already
possess, enormous powers that can be brought to bear to insure management
fidelity"?'] Here, "powers" refers to influence, not corporate control. "As yet these
powers have remained substantially unexercised."' 2
B. The Growth and Functions of Institutional Investors
Chapter two contains some of the authors' valuable factual material. Collectively,
the five major institutional investors had total assets in 1962 of $695 billion as
5. Baum & Stiles, The Silent Partners 6 (1965). For more complete citations and com-
mentary, see Baum, Institutional Investors: A Check on the Management of the Giant
Corporation, Aug. 1960 (unpublished thesis in New York University Law Library). The
book is an edited and updated version of this thesis. In general, resort to the thesis for fur-
ther treatment is effortless, since chapters and headings follow along in the same order, with
the exception of chapter seven, the bulk of which appears early in the thesis at pages 36-57.
6. Loomis, The Pension Funds Still Want Stocks, Fortune, June 1966, p. 130.
7. Ibid. Specifically referable only to pension funds, the survey summarized: "In 1964
their net purchases of stocks amounted to $2.3 billion (roughly the same as in each of the
three years before), or 46 per cent of their total investment. But in 1965 net stock purchases
rose dramatically to $3 billion, an impressive 60 per cent of the total." Ibid. Later figures tell
the same story regarding mutual funds. "At the end of 1965 some 300 U.S. mutual funds
owned an estimated 5% of the $537.5 billion worth of shares listed on the New York Stock
Exchange, up from 4% of the value of all Big Board issues in 1960 and 2% in 1950. In some
individual issues, mutual fund ownership runs as high as 401." Wall Street J., June 7, 1966,
p. 1, col. 6.
8. Baum & Stiles, The Silent Partners 12 (1965).
9. Ibid.
10. Id. at 7.
11. Id. at 27.
12. Ibid.
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compared with the gross national product for the same year of $554.8 billion. "The
New York Stock Exchange has estimated that, through these institutions, more
than 100 million Americans today share indirectly in the benefits of equity invest-
ment."'1 3 (Would not the total asset-value of the nation have been a more appropriate
comparison than the GNP?)
"The growth of institutional investors in recent years has been dramatic. Total
assets of savings institutions, exclusive of commercial banks, have increased from $37
billion in 1929 to $361.7 billion in 1962."'14 After this introduction, the authors discuss
the parallel dramatic growth of each of the major institutional investors.
The remainder of the chapter describes the usual investment approach of any such
company. The Wharton Report has disclosed mutual-fund information generally un-
available for other institutional investors. Arguably, however, the following Wharton
judgment could be pronounced on all: " '[T]he funds' performance 'did not differ
appreciably from what would have been achieved by an unmanaged portfolio with
the same division among asset types. About half the funds performed better, half
worse. "15
As to investment policy "the overriding characteristic of all institutional investment
is conservatism. 'Blue Chip' stocks, or the 'favorite fifty,' are overwhelming institutional
favorites. New ventures and unseasoned securities are avoided."'1 As corroborative
of this summary statement, the investment policies of each of the five institutional
investors are then analyzed. As would be expected, "in 1962 mutual funds held $17.6
billion in common stocks, representing 82.7 per cent of their total assets,"1 7 whereas
"at the end of 1962 life insurance companies had . . . . only $4.1 billion or 3.1 per
cent of their total assets invested in common stocks."' 8
The material in chapter three, "Institutional Concentrates and Market Impact," is
largely an expansion of facts already presented earlier in the book. "Thus, the con-
clusion is inescapable that the 'favorite fifty' are really favorite."' 9 The last paragraph
makes the transition to the book's third major division by briefly adverting to the
influence-but not control--possessed by the institutional investor:
The conclusions of fact may be more generally summed up: Institutional investors
possess power in their portfolio corporations. This power is reflected on the stock
market as a factor in raising or lowering stock prices. It accordingly affects other
shareholders. . . . Finally, this power, exercised or nonexercised, serves as a sanction
or endorsement of management. . . . Some examples of the uses of this power are
considered in the following chapter. Institutions have not always remained the silent
partners in American businesses, despite the fact that they may have wished to do
SO. 2 0
This brief paragraph could be particularly confusing to the casual reader, for here
conjoined are all three meanings of the omnipresent "power."
The "conclusions of fact" which were "more generally summed up" refer to those
powerful attributes of the institutions themselves. These attributes affect the market
and only indirectly the portfolio company.
13. Id. at 30.
14. Id. at 31-32.
15. Id. at 35.
16. Id. at 43.
17. Id. at 45.
18. Id. at 47.
19. Id. at 54.
20. Id. at 65-66,
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The last sentence of the paragraph once again alludes to "the silent partners." One
would assume that the silence concerns the "corporate control" of the subtitle,
which, of course, is not the case.
C. Influences on Portfolio Companies
In chapter four, several fascinating narratives exemplify the pressures, more often
indirect than direct, that institutional investors have placed on their portfolio com-
panies. The purposes of these pressures, as illustrated, were salutary: to avert catastro-
phies, to correct abuses or to aid in formulating specific management policies in the
portfolio corporations.
To what extent has the institutional investor actually exerted this influence? 'he
conclusion prompted is this: '[I]nvestment companies as shareholders are doing
little or nothing toward fulfillment of their obligations as shareholder participants
in corporate affairs, either to their own shareholders or to shareholders generally."'-'
The various narratives describe the nature of this influence, as rare as it may be,
but evidence no particular pattern, and concern successively: (1) the institutional
suasion toward competent Ward management at the time of the Avery-Wolfson
battle; (2) the nonexercise of institutional influence in the Robert Young-New York
Central proxy fight; (3) insurance-company activity "in the shaping of fundamental
corporate policies"; 22 (4) the attacks by the Lewis Gilbert corps on excessive manage-
ment compensation; and (5) institutional-investor representation on portfolio-com-
pany boards.
D. Internal Regulation of Institutional Investors
The principal burden of The Silent Partners is borne by chapters five and six. The
opening words of chapter five raise hopes that now the promise of the book's subtitle
will be fulfilled, that now the discussion is embarked on the legal restraints on the
corporate control of the institutional investor. "Our purpose now is to examine the
framework of existing legal restraints on the exercise of institutional power. We do
not, of course, attempt to describe in detail the labyrinth of laws, regulations, and
administrative practices governing institutional behavior, but only those which seem
most relevant to the problem of portfolio holdings."- 3
But at the section's end, the discussion has not touched the portfolio companies at all,
let alone corporate control, or even influence. The authors conclude and summarize
this core section accurately: "The web of state and federal regulation affecting the
activities of institutional investors has been described, although in somewhat summary
fashion."' 2 The summary was limited, moreover, to the internal affairs of four of
the five major institutional investors: life insurance companies, banks, investment
companies, and foundations. Without the understanding that the "power" discussed in
these two chapters is strictly nonportfolio and exclusively intra-industry, one could
again be misled.
Buried here in the very middle of the book, in the opening pages of chapter five,
occur two statements that present exactly the scope and necessary limits of the book.
21. Id. at 67, quoting from Emerson, Some Sociological and Legal Aspects of Institutional
and Individual Participation Under the SEC's Shareholder Proposal Rule, 34 U. Det. L.J.
528, 547 (1957).
22. Baum & Stiles, The Silent Partners 74 (1965).
23. Id. at 82.
24. Id. at 126.
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The first of these major statements is that "it cannot be said that institutional in-
vestors, even as a group, have anything approaching absolute power in the sense of
capacity to control either the stock market or the managements of their portfolio
concerns." 25
With the question of "institutional investors and corporate control" thus eliminated,
this last statement prompts the thought that legal restraints nevertheless restrain the
exercise of influence over their portfolio concerns. The second major statement, how-
ever, quashes that thought. "Save for the antitrust laws, the regulators have evidenced
little or no concern over the activities of institutional investors in relation to their
portfolio corporations." 26 Not only are the "legal restraints" which are discussed
throughout the core of the book irrelevant either to corporate control or influence, but
they do not even adequately regulate the internal affairs of the institutional investors.
"Finally, the sorry fact also emerging from the description in this chapter is that
most of the regulatory bodies have a difficult enough time achieving even the limited
goals they pursue."'27
The introduction to chapter six repeats that of chapter five: "Institutional investors
hold the power to check the managements of their portfolio corporations. Yet for the
most part they have avoided using that power."28 Chapter six, as did five, then con-
siders the attempt by the antitrust laws to reduce monopoly within the various in-
stitutional-investor fields.
E. Corporate Control
In chapter seven, "Power and Responsibility," the word "power" shifts to its
third usage, corporate control. Here, for the first time, The Silent Partners takes up
its announced subject.
Among modem legal problems, corporate control could conceivably command the
closest original thinking, and justly so. Fortunately both the courts and the com-
mentators have, particularly in the last five years, recognized the importance and
complexity of the control question with a spate of pertinent studies.
Among the commentators, Jennings and Berle remain far in the forefront but some
valuable comment, pressed by the recent cases, has radically changed the control
thinking from its status in the late fifties.2
25. Id. at 81.
26. Id. at 82.
27. Ibid.
28. Id. at 133. See Baum, op. cit. supra note 5, at 79-81.
29. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78
Harv. L. Rev. 505 (1965); Bayne, A Legitimate Transfer of Control: The Weyenberg Shoe
-Florsheim Case Study, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 438 (1966); Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Quandary,
51 Cornell L.Q. 49 (1965); Bayne, The Sale of Corporate Control, 33 Fordham L. Rev. 583
(1965) ; Bayne, Corporate Control as a Strict Trustee, 53 Geo. L.J. 543 (1965); Bayne, The
Definition of Corporate Control, 9 St. Louis U.L.J. 444 (1965); Bayne, A Philosophy of
Corporate Control, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 22 (1963); Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of
Corporate Control, 50 Cornell L.Q. 628 (1965); Berle, Control in Corporate Law, 58 Colum.
L. Rev. 1212 (1958); Boyle, The Sale of Controlling Shares: American Law and the Jenkins
Committee, 13 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 185 (1964); Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 Harv.
L. Rev. 986 (1957) ; Javaras, Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply
to Professor Andrews, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 420 (1965); Jennings, Trading In Corporate
Control, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1956) ; Katz, The Sale of Corporate Control, 38 Chicago B. Rec-
ord 376 (1957) ; Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 725 (1956) ;
[Vol. 35
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Three recent New York cases have prompted the principal judicial reflection.
Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates,30 the Lionel litigations,31 and Matter of Carter,3 2 all
posed problems that remain far from answered, but these notable cases did push
control thinking beyond the early landmarks of Perlnm v. Feldmnann,m Insuranshares
Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp.,3 4 and Gerdes v. Reynolds.35
The Silent Partners faced a triple disability in attacking such a formidable task
as Institutional Investors and Corporate Control.
First, the institutional investor as such does not lend itself easily to such a treatment,
principally because nothing inherent in the institutional investor as contralcur dis-
tinguishes it from any other contr~leur. To find the specifics of control referable
exclusively to the institutional investor is, therefore, onerous, if not impossible. The
authors realized this. Understandably none of their control cases, or discussion, in-
volved factors peculiar to the institutional investor as contrbleur.
Second, space limitations inevitably precluded an intensive inspection of such an
emerging subject as control. The fifteen pages allotted at best permit a cursory review.
Third, the concentration of control commentary and adjudication in the years
after 1958, when their review was written, left the authors in an unmanageable
situation. Their resort to trust law as a solution to the control problem especially
highlights the predicament, since this commendable proposal was elaborated in later
years.
II. THE CONTmUTIONS OF THE BOOK
The Silent Partners is primarily a collation and summary of several well-known
studies of the five major classes of institutional investor. The resulting factual con-
spectus, which is comparable to the Tenth Annual Report of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, presents to the legal and economic philosopher the broad
picture of the perceptible-and predictably accelerating-changes from direct share-
holder-ownership in corporate enterprises toward ownership through this second
intermediary. Herein lies the worth of The Silent Partners. The corporate philosopher
can scarcely apply a code of conduct to an unknown problem.
Newman & Pickering, A Premium for Control, 28 Texas B.J. 735 (1965); Sommer, Jr.,
Who's "in Control"?-S.E.C., 21 Bus. Law. 559 (1966); Comment, Sales of Corporate Con-
trol at a Premium: An Analysis and Suggested Approach, 1961 Duke L.J. 554; Note, The
Sale of Corporate Control: The Berle Theory and the Law, 25 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 59 (1963).
30. 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962).
31. There are two distinct Lionel cases. The first was an action to set aside the election
of Lionel directors. Matter of Caplan (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), in N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1964, p. 14, col.
3, aff'd sub nom. Caplan v. Lionel Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep't),
aff'd mem., 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964). The second case was
a derivative action to recover for Lionel the premium received by Defiance Industries, Inc., in
the transfer of control. Gabriel Indus., Inc. v. Defiance Indus., Inc. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), in
N.Y.L.J., June 17, 1964, p. 13, col. 8, aff'd mem., 23 App. Div. 2d 630, 257 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1st
Dep't), motion for leave to appeal denied, 15 N.Y.2d 1031, 207 N.E.2d 867, 260 N.YS.2d
180 (1965).
32. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), in N.Y.L.J., May 26, 1964, p. 17, col. 1, aff'd, 21 App. Div. 2d
543, 251 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1st Dep't 1964).
33. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), reversing 129 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn. 1952), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 952 (1955).
34. 35 F. Supp. 22 (E... Pa. 1940).
35. 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941). Many other control cases are noted in authorities at
note 29 supra.
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Beyond this, the book reached three factual conclusions in limited reference to
corporate control: (1) "it cannot be said that institutional investors, even as a group,
have anything approaching absolute power in the sense of capacity to control either
the stock market or the managements of their portfolio concerns"; 8 o (2) short of
actual corporate control, however, "institutional investors possess . . . [influence] in
their portfolio corporations";3 (3) however, "'investment companies as shareholders
are doing little or nothing toward fulfillment of their obligations as shareholder partici-
pants in corporate affairs, either to their own shareholders or to shareholders
generally.' 38
The institutional investor today, therefore, has not yet moved from mere influence
to the ultimate role of corporate contrbleur. Whether the institutional investor will
soon assume this role remains a fact for the future.
Thusfar, the burden of The Silent Partners.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROBLEM
As its subtitle suggests, The Silent Partners undertook a study of institutional in-
vestors and corporate control. Such a study necessarily poses certain questions: What
factors singularize the institutional investor as a contr~leur?8 9 What control features
are peculiar to the institutional investor? What differentiates One William Street
Fund from W. R. Grace? Why should there be such a special study at all? Why not
two studies-one, the institutional investor, its growth, function and internal regu-
lation; the other, the philosophy of corporate control? These questions-one in fact-
form the theme for further analysis.
A. Size Alone and Antitrust
Awesome size and frightening growth are not the particular qualities which, in
and of themselves, prompt a study of institutional-investor control. The total assets
of General Motors, AT&T, and Jersey Standard are comparable to those of
Metropolitan Life, Prudential and Equitable Life.40 Size alone could not suggest such
a study.
Antitrust is as much present-or absent-for the institutional investor as for any
other complexus. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department watches Pabst,
Consolidated Foods, Genesco and IDS, Continental Casualty, and Crocker-Citizens,
with equally unflagging vigilance. The antitrust laws bestow their favors with un-
biased largess on GM, GE and United States Steel, as recent decisions attest. The
rationale of antitrust law is a valuable inquiry, but not peculiar to the institutional
investor qua contrdleur. Whether the future will permit concentration of "airline
36. Baum & Stiles, The Silent Partners 81 (1965).
37. Id. at 65.
38. Id at 67, quoting from Emerson, supra note 21.
39. A caution is in order here. Throughout the discussion the exact definition of "con-
tr6leur" must be respected. Thus the present study and analysis concerns that institutional
investor which is in the strict sense the contr~leur of its portfolio company. The board of
directors of such investor is by definition the ultimate governing power in the policy hier-
archy. Should a given institutional investor by a different hypothesis be itself in the custody
of a contr8leur (as possibly Manhattan Fund), this variation in the assumption would re-
quire a different approach, but would not affect essentially the underlying philosophy of
corporate control.
40. The Top of the Top, Fortune, July, 1966, p. 227.
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might" in a Pan World Airways as competitive with a Luftfranca is a study for
elsewhere. So seemingly is the merger of Hanover and Manufacturers, of Chase and
Manhattan. Merger, monopoly, or size are not the distinguishing elements.
B. "Other People's Money"
To contemplate $600 billion of other people's money in the hands of the institutional-
investor contrbleur seems to send some to the ramparts. Yet every contrb1eur, by
definition, controls other people's money. Ex hypothesi, ownership must be separated
from control. There is no reason, therefore, for alarm simply because some millions
of owners have seen fit to entrust their assets to the institutional investor. So, too, it is
with GM, AT & T and others.
C. Conflict of Interest
Of all apologies for a special control study, the most ready at hand is that latter-day
ogre, conflict of interest. On first blush, here is the segregating element. Interjected
in a complex of opposing corporate interests is an entirely new tier of conflict-the
public shareholders of the portfolio companies.
As contr~leur, the institutional investor must impartially reconcile the conflicting
interests of its own shareholders and those of the portfolio company. Does this novel
conflict not demand a special inquiry? Surprisingly, some short reflection for example,
on the complexus of the General Tire and Rubber Company, supplies the answer.
General Tire, as contr6leur, does not have any less (or more) a problem in adjusting
the conflicting interests of Aerojet-General, Frontier Airlines and RKO General than
would Chase Manhattan should it suddenly find itself as the cwntr6leur of these same
firms. The conflict-of-interest element is no more peculiar to the control relation
subsisting between an institutional investor and portfolio companies than to a large
corporation and its subsidiaries.
D. The Novelty of the Phetmennon
With each succeeding generation, tort law, faced with new technological advances,
panicked, little realizing that fundamental negligence and intent apply equally to
atomic energy and dangerous animals. Here, it is submitted, lies the real reason
for the genesis of The Silent Partners. A "new contr6leur" has appeared upon the scene.
The Fords, the Mellons, and the Rockefellers are about to be supplanted (or so the
fear is) by the Sears Fund, Metropolitan Life, the Ford Foundation or Investors
Mutual. This may be disturbing, but for reasons unrelated to corporate control
Perhaps size should be curtailed; possibly special steps should be taken against
conflict of interest. However, none of these is distinctive to the institutional investor
qua contr~leur.
IV. EPILOGUE
These reflections lead to one sweeping and important conclusion: except for the
novelty, the fiduciary duty of the institutional investor is that of any other corporate
contr6leur.41 From this flow several corollaries.
41. The complexus of obligations incumbent on the institutional investor in a position
solely of influence but not control would likewise be identified with the duties of any other
influential shareholder in his conduct toward the corporation, the shareholders or other
parties to the enterprise.
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A. The Necessity of Some Contr~leur
Since the modem social system postulates central management of other people's
money, someone must be contrbleur. Nothing intrinsically evil has been found in the
separation of ownership from control. No arcane reason, therefore, suggests itself
for summarily closing the office of contrbleur to the institutional investor. As with
others, the portfolio companies require contrbleur. To entrust the portfolio company
to the institutional investor merely imposes the added duty of reconciling one more
set of interests to the many already present, just as General Tire must impartially
represent each varied interest of its various corporations, shareholders, creditors,
consumers, and employees.
B. Conflict of Interest
The conflict-of-interest problem can be misleading. The law continually strives to
eradicate conflicts of interest. But what kind-between majority and minority
shareholders; between management and labor; between corporation and supplier?
Scarcely. Always and everywhere, within and without the corporate venture, interests
will and must conflict. This is the lubricant of the competitive capitalist machine. To
adjust this very conflict in the most equitable manner is the prime obligation of the
corporate steward, the contr~leur. His is the role of an impartial referee.
The conflict which is anathema to the corporate venture, however, persists between
the personal interests of the steward himself and all other interests in his custody.
The millennium will come, therefore, with the elimination of these personal interests
of the trustee, whether a simple citizen administering an impecunious trust or a giant
corporate contr~leur directing millions in assets-or, to the present point, the
institutional investor who is suddenly contrbleur of a portfolio company. The American
economy must rear up a generation of dedicated, professional stewards, custodians
of other people's money, who are prepared to forego a personal conflict of interest,
and the under-the-table emolument it facilitates.
C. Trust Law
At the crucial point where conflict of interest, trust law, and the contr~leur meet,
a prevalent misconception has added confusion to an inherently subtle subject. This
confusion will tend necessarily to becloud the role of the institutional investor as a
corporate contrbleur. The popular mind, especially when put to the corporate field,
conceives trust law as the antidote to every conflict-of-interest poison.
To the contrary, the fiduciary duties of a strict trustee are not imposed on a
contrbleur because of a conflict of interest. Rather, conflict of interest is outlawed
because of the law of a strict trustee.
The trust obligation is founded on the absolute dominion of the steward. Because
he has complete custody of all the beneficiary's assets, the contrbleur is held to the
strictest standards. The utter helplessness of the beneficiary inexorably engenders the
protective code of the trust, imposed without inquiry. This is the custodial concept
of corporate control. Absent dominion and custody, conflict of interest is obviously
permissible. Arm's-length negotiations not only permit, but even postulate by hy-
pothesis an inherent conflict of interest.
The solution, then, seems simple: (1) the rigid application of the custodial concept
of corporate control to the institutional investor as portfolio-company contr~leur, and
(2) the elimination, wherever possible, of personal conflict in such position, whether
of an institutional investor or any other. (The infinity of such conflicts in American




The emergence of the institutional investor as the "new contrbleur" seems not so
frighteningly novel after all. Since the several surveys of The Silent Partners have
supplied the factual wherewithal to the corporate philosophers, the application of the
age-old law of trusts and the modem custodial concept of corporate control42 should
not be a difficult chore.
DAVM C. BAYNE, S.J.*
Forensic Psychiatry. By Henry A. Davidson, M.D. New York: Ronald Press Co.
2d ed. 1965. Pp. x, 473. $10.00.
Psychiatry currently is experiencing a significant transition reflecting general profes-
sional trends in broadening and intensifying its involvement in community problems.
Federal support for community mental health services, training, and research has
attracted large numbers of psychiatrists and other behavioral scientists to participate
in ever-expanding community and social psychiatry programs. Riding the crest of this
wave of activity have been those psychiatrists involved in all phases of the legal pro-
cess.' Thus, we are witnessing an increased number of psychiatric court clinics, cor-
rectional psychiatric programs and follow-up treatment centers for parolees and
probationers.2
Since 1954 and the now-classical Durham decision of criminal responsibility,3 literally
hundreds of articles have been written by attorneys and psychiatrists on all aspects of
the interface of law and psychiatry. Several textbooks of legal psychiatry have also
appeared, outlining didactic and academic issues.
With this heightened interest on the part of both lawyers and psychiatrists and the
increasing utilization of psychiatric testimony in both civil and criminal cases, the
need for a "handbook" of forensic psychiatry is clearly recognized. Dr. Davidson's
original text published in 1952, guiding many psychiatrists entering this field, has been
brought up to date in a most noteworthy manner. Of all the textbooks on law and
psychiatry, this volume serves best to orient the psychiatrist to the nature of the prob-
lems involved, and offers him the benefits of Dr. Davidson's long and extensive experi-
ence. It is highly recommended as the best practical guide currently available for the
forensic psychiatrist.
Dr. Davidson divides the book into three parts: the "Content of Forensic Psychi-
atry," "The Tactics of Testimony" and the "Appendix," which includes a legal lexicon
for doctors, a psychiatric glossary for lawyers and examination guides.
His presentation of the content of forensic psychiatry is highlighted by his outlining
a detailed examination of the defendant with appropriate means of reporting the case
42. For a more thorough consideration see Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control,
112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 22 (1963).
*Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, St. Louis, Missouri.
1. Sadoff, Psychiatry Pleads Guilty, 51 A.B.A.J. 48-49 (1965).
2. Sadoff, Polsky & Heller, The Forensic Psychiatry Clinic: Model for a New Approach,
Paper Presented Before the Annual Meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, May
1966.
3. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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to the judge. Included also are the essential features of personal injury evaluation,
marriage, divorce and annulment, placement and custody of children, last will and
testament, appraisal of the sex offender, medico-legal aspects of alcoholism and the
laws on addiction. A most enlightening chapter on the psychiatrist in the juvenile
court is written with a view to understanding the problems facing the juvenile court
judge. A separate chapter, devoted to the difficult task of evaluating malingering is
prepared in a meaningful and scholarly way.
Perhaps his two best chapters are his newest----"Mental Illness and Civil Rights" and
"Malpractice and the Psychiatrist." Too many textbooks on forensic psychiatry omit
discussions of these two timely topics. His presentation of mental illness and civil
rights is apparently aimed at rebutting some of the arguments posed by Dr. Thomas
Szasz.4 Davidson refers to Dr. Karl Bowman's concept of the importance of medical
rights of the patient as distinct from his legal rights, and polarizes the issue by stating:
"Either the compulsory hospitalization of the patient is a medical problem to be dis-
posed of without the flavor of courts, without sheriffs, due process, subpoenas, judges,
juries, and charges. Or it is a legal problem, in which case the patient is entitled to due
process down to the last iota-to his day in court, where he is confronted with all who
would say he is sick. '6
I cannot accept the reality of this extreme view and feel that a balance must be
sought to protect both the medical and legal rights of the individual where feasible.
It is conceivable that Dr. Davidson would agree with this position in a larger sense as
he states later: "In facing these civil rights dilemmas, it must be remembered that
there are two levels of sophistication. The glib way is to say that civil liberties are
absolute. But at a higher level of sophistication, there will be concern for the rights of
peaceful citizens. In this imperfect world not every problem is capable of a simple
solution." 6
Currently it has become quite important to safeguard an individual's legal rights.
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court with regard to confessions, for example, have
highlighted this concern. In a similar vein, I would consider the medical rights of the
individual to be as crucial and in need of legislative or judicial safeguards. Generally
there is a fairly high consistency in the consideration of one's legal and medical rights.
However, it is conceivable that situations might arise that would compromise either
one's legal rights or his medical rights (needs). In the event of such a conflict, it is my
feeling that medical needs supersede legal rights. Denying one his legal rights may lead
to loss of liberty, but denying him his medical needs may lead to loss of life.
The optimal balance suggested above appears to be approaching reality in the form
of combined medical, custodial facilities wherein an individual may be legally in-
carcerated and yet provided his medical needs. A combined institution of this nature
was recently born in Philadelphia. This State Maximum Security Forensic Diagnostic
Hospital is a 100-bed state hospital facility housed in a maximal security institution
(Holmesburg County Prison) staffed by Temple University professional personnel.
Defendants and inmates in need of ninety-day observation and psychiatric evaluation
are committed to this unit by the Quarter Sessions Court of Philadelphia. These indi-
viduals formerly were sent directly to Philadelphia State Hospital from which they
often escaped and frightened the community. Thus, this unit serves both to safeguard
the individual's medical and legal rights while also protecting society.
Another aspect of this conflict was raised by Mr. Albert B. Logan, executive direc-
4. Szasz, Law, Liberty, and Psychiatry (1963).
5. Davidson, Forensic Psychiatry 282 (2d ed. 1965).
6. Id. at 286.
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tor of the North American Judges Association.7 He refers to the problem of alcoholism
and addiction and the means by which these problems currently are being handled by
our courts. This issue is as yet unresolved-there are many who feel alcoholism is a
medical problem and just as many who see it as a social problem to be handled by
social-legal controls rather than purely medical ones. The Fourth Circuit, for example,
recently stated that "when [chronic alcoholism] ... is the conduct for which [a
person] .. . is criminally accused, there can be no judgment of criminal conviction
passed upon him."
Dr. Szasz has repeatedly commented on the medical usurpation of legal rights in the
individual by hospitalizing the "sick" person, rather than incarcerating a "malad-
justed" individual who commits a crime.9 His argument is one of semantics and has
little relevance in a post-mortem investigation.
The series of situations in which the psychiatrist may be open to a malpractice suit
is presented in an imaginative but realistic sense. Dr. Davidson presents a series of
sixteen hypothetical situations which are likely occurrences in a routine psychiatric
practice. His comments with respect to the possibility of a law suit and how it can be
handled and prevented in each of these situations are invaluable. Illustrative of the
special problems which a psychiatrist faces is the treatment of "incompetent indi-
viduals" whose consent for operative procedures is defective. This is most likely to
occur when the patient is "consenting" to electroconvulsive therapy for severe depres-
sion.
In addition, the psychiatrist treating severely depressed individuals is faced with the
possibility of suicide in his patients and must communicate this possibility to a respon-
sible family member. Suicide, however, is often quite unpredictable and may occur
without expectation. Furthermore, the psychiatrist deals with patients who often live
in a fantasy world and whose grasp of reality is tenuous. The fantasied expectations of
cure may be unrealistic and need to be properly considered and dealt with by the
psychiatrist.
In many respects, a psychiatrist acts as a depriver of freedom because of his involve-
ment in commitment procedures. In this sense, we approach the balance of medical
and legal rights of the individual. If the individual's legal rights are transgressed, and
his medical needs unwarranted, the physician may be in a very difficult legal position.
Psychiatrists must be aware of the basic elements of malpractice, as Dr. Davidson has
stated, and also must be aware of the individual's legal rights. The art of medicine in
psychiatry often involves the art of determining the priority of medical needs within
the framework of civil liberties.
The second part of this text deals with the tactics of testimony and is recommended
reading for any psychiatrist preparing to testify in court. In this day of increasing
utilization of psychiatric testimony, it behooves the psychiatrist to be aware of the
nature of medical testimony and the role of the physician in court, including "court-
room etiquette."
Most unique and especially helpful to both lawyers and psychiatrists is the "Ap-
7. Logan, May a Man Be Punished Because He Is Ill?, 52 A.B.A.J. 932 (1966).
8. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F2d 761, 764 (4th Cir. 1966). This case, as well as the problem
of chronic alcoholism in general, is discussed in Murtagh, Arrests for Public Intoxication, 35
Fordham L. Rev. 1 (1966).
9. See Szasz, Mental Illness is a Myth, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1966, § 6 (Magazine), p. 30.
Dr. Szasz has stated his extreme position as follows: "I do not believe that insanity should
be an 'excusing condition' for crime. Lawbreakers, irrespective of their 'mental health,' ought
to be treated as offenders." Id. at 91.
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pendix" which includes pertinent definitions of legal and psychiatric terms and a series
of examination guides. These guides are complete, well-structured and a great help to
the psychiatrist initially entering the field of forensic psychiatry.
Perhaps Dr. Davidson's greatest contribution is his completely pragmatic approach
to the problems of forensic psychiatry, presented in clear, direct language. He usually
avoids lengthy discussion of the areas of conflict between law and psychiatry and
appears to present an attitude of experienced resignation to the authority of the law.
Whereas more polemic writers have emphasized the inconsistencies between psychiatry
and law, Dr. Davidson teaches his fellow psychiatrists that they must conform their
psychiatric testimony, their attitudes and their examinations to the requirements
demanded by the law. He repeatedly states that if the psychiatrist is unable to do
this, his testimony or his report is of no help to the court. It seems that Dr. David-
son has made a personal reconciliation of his role within the legal structure and appears
quite comfortable in presenting his material in this manner, without inflaming negative
or hopeless feelings, as others have done.
The book is not filled with academic and didactic issues, as may be found in other
textbooks of law and psychiatry, and I am sure it was not designed to be. However,
for completeness, a textbook of forensic psychiatry for the psychiatrist ought to
point out the areas of inconsistency which need to be clarified, reworked and better-
instituted by lawyers, judges and psychiatrists. Thus, the frontiers of forensic psy-
chiatry are not presented in the most didactic manner but only as they appear within
the existing legal structure. For example, Davidson states: "It is poor policy to present
to the court, prosecutor, or jury a dynamic explanation of the offense."' ( Generally,
this is true, but preliminary exploration of judges' attitudes and desires at Sentencing
Institutes indicates that they are interested in psychodynamics and dynamic patterns
of behavior. The frontier area here is educating the judiciary to the importance of
dynamics, their value and validity in specific cases, and not remaining content with
only a partial explanation of the defendant's maladjustment to society. The psychi-
atrist must share in a meaningful way with the court how he arrives at his conclu-
sions. In this manner he may be of increasing aid to the court in making a proper
disposition.
A chapter outlining these "frontier areas" with suggestions of future resolution of
difficulties would be a valuable addition based on Dr. Davidson's vast experience. The
absence of such a chapter, however, does not in any sense detract from the value of
this "handbook" of forensic psychiatry. In summary, with the current trend of ex-
panding community involvement by psychiatrists in many and varied situations, Dr.
Davidson's excellent guide to forensic psychiatry is a most worthy contribution.
ROBERT L. SADoPT, M.D.*
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